In this paper we systematically explore questions of succinctness in modal logics employed in spatial reasoning. We show that the closure operator, despite being less expressive, is exponentially more succinct than the limit-point operator, and that the µ-calculus is exponentially more succinct than the equally-expressive tangled limit operator. These results hold for any class of spaces containing at least one crowded metric space or containing all spaces based on ordinals below ω ω , with the usual limit operator. We also show that these results continue to hold even if we enrich the less succinct language with the universal modality.
Introduction
In spatial reasoning, as in any other application of logic, there are several criteria to take into account when choosing an appropriate formal system. A more expressive logic has greater potential applicability, but often at the cost of being less tractable. Similarly, a more succinct logic is preferable, for example, when storage capacity is limited: even when two formal languages L 1 and L 2 are equally expressive, it may be the case that certain properties may be represented in L 1 by much shorter expressions than in L 2 . As we will see, this is sometimes the case even when L 1 is strictly less expressive than L 2 .
Qualitative spatial reasoning deals with regions in space and abstract relations between them, without requiring a precise description of them. It is useful in settings where data about such regions is incomplete or, otherwise, highly complex, yet precise numerical values of coordinates are not necessary: in such a context, qualitative descriptions may suffice and can be treated more efficiently from a computational perspective. One largely unexplored aspect of such efficiency lies in the succinctness of the formal languages employed. To this end, our goal is to develop a first approximation to the study of succinctness in the context of modal logics of space.
State-of-the-art in succinctness research
Succinctness is an important research topic that has been quite active for the last couple of decades. For example, it was shown by Grohe and Schweikardt [1] that the four-variable fragment of first-order logic is exponentially more succinct than the three-variable one on linear orders, while Eickmeyer et al. [2] offer a study of the succinctness of order-invariant sentences of first-order and monadic second-order logic on graphs of bounded tree-depth. Succinctness problems for temporal logics for formal verification of programs were studied, among others, by Wilke [3] , Etessami et al. [4] , and Adler and Immerman [5] , while it was convincingly argued by Gogic et al. [6] that, as far as knowledge representations formalisms studied in the artificial intelligence are concerned, succinctness offers a more fine-grained comparison criterion than expressivity or computational complexity.
Intuitively, proving that one language L 1 is more succinct than another language L 2 ultimately boils down to proving a sufficiently big lower bound on the size of L 2 -formulas expressing some semantic property. For example, if we want to show that L 1 is exponentially 3 more succinct than L 2 , we have to find an infinite sequence of semantic properties (i.e., classes of models) P 1 , P 2 , . . . definable in both L 1 and L 2 , show that there are L 1 -formulas ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . defining P 1 , P 2 , . . . and prove that, for every n, every L 2 -formula ψ n defining P n has size exponential in the size of ϕ n . Many such lower bound proofs, especially in the setting of temporal logics, rely on automata theoretic arguments possibly combined with complexity theoretic assumptions. In the present paper, we use formula-size games that were developed in the setting of Boolean function complexity by Razborov [7] and in the setting of first-order logic and some temporal logics by Adler and Immerman [5] . By now, the formula-size games have been adapted to a host of modal logics (see for example French et al. [8] , Hella and Vilander [9] , Figueira and Gorín [10] , van der Hoek et al. [11] ) and used to obtain lower bounds on modal formulas expressing properties of Kripke models. Our goal is to build upon these techniques in order to apply them to modal logics employed in spatial reasoning.
Spatial interpretations of modality
Modal logic is an extension of propositional logic with a 'modality' and its dual, ◻, so that if ϕ is any formula, ϕ and ◻ϕ are formulas too. There are several interpretations for these modalities, but one of the first was studied by McKinsey and Tarski [12] , who proposed a topological reading for them. These semantics have regained interest in the last decades, due to their potential for spatial reasoning, especially when modal logic is augmented with a universal modality as studied by Shehtman [13] , or fixpoint operators studied by the first author [14] and Goldblatt and Hodkinson [15] .
(ii) A ⊆ c(A),
(iii) c(A) = c(c(A)) and (iv) c(A ∪ B) = c(A) ∪ c(B).
We will say that any set X equipped with a function c∶ 2 X → 2 X satisfying these four properties is a closure space, and that c is a closure operator. Closure spaces are simply topological spaces in disguise, but presenting them in this fashion will have many advantages for us. To be precise, if (X, c) is a closure space and A = c(A), we say that X is closed, and its complement is open; the family of open sets then gives a topology in the usual way. 4 From a computational perspective, it can be more convenient to work with closure spaces than with metric spaces, as finite, non-trivial closure spaces can be defined in a straightforward way, and thus spatial relations can be represented using finite structures. To be precise, let W be a set and R ⊆ W × W be a binary relation; the structure (W, R) is a frame. Then, if R is a preorder (i.e., a [A] = {w ∈ W ∶ ∃v ∈ A (w R v)} is a closure operator.
A good deal of the geometric properties of regions in a metric space X are reflected in the behavior of its closure operator; however, some information is inevitably lost. It has been observed that more information about the structure of X is captured if we instead consider its limit operator. For A ⊆ X, define d(A) to be the set of points such that, for every ε > 0, there is y ∈ a different from x such that δ(x, y) < ε. It is no longer the case that A ⊆ d(A): for example, if A = {x} consists of a single point, then d(A) = ∅.
Nevertheless, d still satisfies the following properties. Proposition 1.3. Let X be a metric space, and let d∶ 2 X → 2 X be its limit operator. Then, for any A, B ⊆ X, In order to treat closure operators and limit operators uniformly, we will define a convergence space to be a pair (X, d), where d∶ 2 X → 2 X satisfies these three properties (see Definition 2.2). In any convergence space, we can then define c(A) = A ∪ d(A), but in general, it is not possible to define d in terms of c using Boolean operations. In particular, the isolated points of A can be defined as the elements of A∖d(A), but they cannot be defined in terms of c (see Figure  1 ). As before, a convenient source of convergence spaces is provided by finite frames: if (W, R) is such that R is transitive (but not necessarily reflexive), then
Logics involving the d operator are more expressive than those with c alone, for example being able to distinguish the real line from higher-dimensional space and Euclidean spaces from arbitrary metric spaces, as shown by Bezhanishvili et al. [17] . Nevertheless, as we will see, modal logic with the c-interpretation of modal logic is exponentially more succinct than modal logic with the dinterpretation.
Layout of the article
In Section 2, we review the syntax and semantics of the spatial µ-calculus, extended in Section 3 to include the closure and tangled limit operators. Section 4 then reviews some model-theoretic operations that preserve the truth of modal formulas, and Section 5 discusses the classes of spaces that we will be interested in.
Section 6 presents the game-theoretic techniques that we will use to establish our core results in Section 7, where it is shown that the closure operator is more succinct than the limit-point operator. This is extended to include the tangled limit operator and the universal modality in Section 8, leading to our main results, namely Theorem 8.6 and Theorem 8.7. Finally, Section 9 provides some concluding remarks and open problems.
The spatial µ-calculus
In this section we present the modal µ-calculus and formalize its semantics over convergence spaces, a general class of models that allow us to study all the semantic structures we are interested in under a unified framework. Let us begin by defining the basic formal language we will work with.
Syntax
We will consider logics over variants of the language L µ ∀ given by the following grammar (in Backus-Naur form). Fix a set P of propositional variables, and define:
Here, p ∈ P , p denotes the negation of p, and p may not occur in µp.ϕ or νp.ϕ. For the game-theoretic techniques we will use, it is convenient to allow negations only at the atomic level, and thus we include all duals as primitives, but not negation or implication; however, we may use the latter as shorthands, defined via de Morgan's laws. As usual, formulas of the forms p, p are literals. It will also be crucial for our purposes to measure the size of formulas: the size of a formula ϕ is denoted ϕ and is defined as the number of nodes in its syntax tree.
Sublanguages of L µ ∀ are denoted by omitting some of the operators, with the convention that whenever an operator is included, so is its dual (for example, L includes the modalities , ◻ but does not allow ∀, ∃, µ or ν).
Convergence spaces
Spatial interpretations of modal logics are usually presented in terms of topological spaces. Here we will follow an unorthodox route, instead introducing modal spaces, and as a special case convergence spaces; both the closure and limit point operators give rise to convergence spaces, while Kripke models can be seen as modal spaces. As a general convention, structures (e.g. frames or models) will be denoted A, B, . . ., while classes of structures will be denoted A, B, . . .. The domain of a structure A will be denoted by A . 
A modal space is a pair A = ( A , ρ A ), where A is any set and
We say that ρ A is a convergence operator if it also satisfies (c1) ρ A (∅) = ∅, and
If ρ A is a convergence operator, we will say that A is a convergence space.
If X ⊆ ρ A (X) for all X ⊆ A , we say that ρ A is inflationary. An inflationary convergence operator is a closure operator, and if ρ A is a closure operator then A is a closure space.
This general presentation will allow us to unify semantics over metric spaces with those over arbitrary relational structures. Remark 2.3. Modal spaces are just neighborhood structures [18] in disguise; indeed, if (A, N ) is a neighborhood structure (i.e., N ⊆ A × 2 A ), we may set ρ N (X) to be the set of a ∈ A such that every neighborhood of a intersects X. Conversely, if X ⊆ A and a ∈ A , we let X be a neighborhood of a if a ∈ρ A (X).
As mentioned before, a Kripke frame is simply a structure A = ( A , R A ), where A is a set and R A ⊆ A × A is an arbitrary binary relation. We will implicitly identify A with the modal space ( A , ρ A ), where ρ A (X) = R −1 A [X] for any X ⊆ A . It is readily verified that the operator ρ A thus defined is normal. In this sense, modal spaces generalize Kripke frames, but the structure ( A , ρ A ) is not always a convergence space. Nevertheless, convergence spaces may be obtained by restricting our attention to frames where R A is transitive.
The names for these classes are derived from their corresponding modal logics (see e.g. [19] ). The following is then readily verified, and we mention it without proof: Proposition 2.5.
) is a convergence space, and
) is a closure space. Before defining our semantics, we need to briefly discuss least and greatest fixed points. Let X be a set and f ∶ 2
. Say that A * is a fixed point of f if f (A * ) = A * . Then, the following is well-known:
X is monotone, then
1. f has a ⊆-least fixed point, which we denote LFP(f ), and 2. f has a ⊆-greatest fixed point, which we denote GFP(f ).
This result is discussed in some detail in the context of the spatial µ-calculus in [15] . With this, we turn our attention from frames to models.
Models and truth definitions
Formulas of L µ ∀ are interpreted as subsets of a convergence space, but first we need to determine the propositional variables that are true at each point. Definition 2.7. If A is a modal space, a valuation on A is a function V ∶ A → 2 P (recall that P is the set of atoms). A modal space A equipped with a valuation V is a model. If A is a convergence space, then (A, V ) is a convergence model. If X ⊆ A and p ∈ P , we define a new valuation V [X p] by setting
• for q = p, q ∈ V [X p] (w) if and only if q ∈ V (w), and
• p ∈ V [X p] (w) if and only if w ∈ X. Now we are ready to define the semantics for L µ ∀ . Definition 2.8. Let (A, V ) be a model. We define the truth set
We first need an auxiliary definition for the cases µp.ϕ and νp.ϕ. Suppose inductively that ϕ has been defined for any valuation V ′ , and define a function
. With this, we define:
Given a model (A, V ) and formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L µ ∀ , we say that ϕ is equivalent to ψ on A if ϕ V = ψ V . If A is a modal space, ϕ, ψ are equivalent on A if they are equivalent on any model of the form (A, V ), and if A is a class of structures, we say that ϕ, ψ are equivalent over A if they are equivalent on any element of A. When A or A is clear from context, we may write ϕ ≡ ψ, and if ψ = ⊺ we say ϕ is valid.
It is readily verified that if p does not appear in ϕ, it follows that λp.ϕ[V ] is monotone, and hence the above definition is sound. On occasion, if M is a model with valuation V , we may write ⋅ M or even ⋅ instead of ⋅ V . In the case that (A, V ) is a Kripke model, the semantics we have just defined coincide with the standard relational semantics [19] . To see this, note that for any formula ϕ and any w ∈ A , w ∈ ϕ if and only if w ∈ ρ A ( ϕ ), which means that
i.e., there is v ∈ ϕ such that w R A v. Thus, the interpretation of coincides with the standard relational interpretation in modal logic.
The extended spatial language
The spatial µ-calculus, as we have presented it, may be naturally extended to include other definable operations. Of course such extensions will not add any expressive power to our language, but as we will see later in the text, they can yield considerable gains in terms of succinctness. We begin by discussing the closure operator.
The closure operator
As we have mentioned, the closure operator is definable in terms of the limit point operator on metric spaces. Let us make this precise. We will denote the closure operator by ϕ, defined as a shorthand for ϕ ∨ ϕ. Dually, the interior operator ⊞ϕ will be defined as ϕ ∧ ◻ϕ. To do this, let L µ ∀ be the extension of L µ ∀ which includes , ⊞ as primitives. Then, for ϕ ∈ L µ ∀ , define a formula
∀ by letting t (⋅) commute with Booleans and all modalities except for , ⊞, in which case t ( ϕ) = t (ϕ)∨ t (ϕ) and t (⊞ϕ) = t (ϕ)∧◻t (ϕ).
Semantics for L µ ∀ are defined by setting ϕ V = t (ϕ) V , and we extend Definition 2.1 to L µ ∀ in the obvious way, by
With this, we can give an easy upper bound on the translation t .
However, this bound is not optimal; it can be improved if we instead define in terms of We omit the proof, which is straightforward. Whenever is interpreted as a convergence operator, is then interpreted as a closure operator. To be precise, given a modal space A, define a new operator ρ
is an inflationary modal space, and if A is a convergence space, it follows that A + is a closure space. If (A, V ) is any model and ϕ is any formula, it is straightforward to check that
In the setting of Kripke models, we see that w ∈ ϕ V if and only if w ∈ ϕ V , or there is v ∈ W such that wR A v and v ∈ ϕ V ; as was the case for ϕ, this coincides with the standard relational semantics, but with respect to the reflexive closure of R A .
Tangled limits
There is one final extension to our language of interest to us; namely, the tangled limit operator, known to be expressively equivalent to the µ-calculus over the class of convergence spaces, but with arguably simpler syntax and semantics. 
We extend ⋅ and
We call * the tangled limit operator; this was introduced by Dawar and Otto [20] in the context of K4 frames, then extended by the first author [14] to closure spaces and by Goldblatt and Hodkinson [15] to other convergence spaces. For clarity, let us give a direct definition of * without translating into the µ-calculus.
Lemma 3.4. If (A, V ) is a convergence model, ϕ 1 , ⋯, ϕ n any sequence of formulas, and x ∈ A , then x ∈ * {ϕ 1 , ⋯, ϕ n } V if and only if there is S ⊆ A such that x ∈ S and, for all i ≤ n, S ⊆ ρ A (S ∩ ϕ i V ).
Although Dawar and Otto proved in [20] that the tangled limit operator is equally expressive as the µ-calculus, they use model-theoretic techniques that do not provide an explicit translation. As such, we do not provide an upper bound in the following result.
on the class of K4 models. Spatial interpretations of the tangled closure and limit operators have gathered attention in recent years (see e.g. [21, 22, 23, 24] ). Later we will show that the tangled limit operator, despite being equally expressive, is exponentially less succinct than the µ-calculus.
Truth-preserving transformations
Let us review some notions from the model theory of modal logics, and lift them to the setting of convergence spaces. We begin by discussing bisimulations, the standard notion of equivalence between Kripke models; or, more precisely between pointed models, which are pairs (A, a) such that A is a model respectively and a ∈ A .
Bisimulations
The well-known notion of bisimulation between Kripke models readily generalizes to the setting of convergence spaces, using what we call confluent relations. Below, we say that two pointed models (A, a) and (B, b) differ on the truth of a propositional variable p when we have (A, a) ⊧ p whereas (B, b) ⊧ p, or vice-versa. If (A, a) and (B, b) do not differ on p, then they agree on p.
Definition 4.1. Let A = ( A , ρ A ) and B = ( B , ρ B ) be modal spaces and χ ⊆ A × B . We say that χ is forward confluent if, for all X ⊆ A ,
Say that χ is backward confluent if χ −1 is forward confluent, and confluent if it is forward and backward confluent.
Let Q ⊆ P be a set of atoms. If (A, V A ) and (B, V B ) are models, a bisimulation relative to Q is a confluent relation χ ⊆ A × B such that if a χ b, then (A, a) agrees with (B, b) on all atoms of Q. If Q is not specified, we assume that Q = P .
A bisimulation between pointed models (A, a) and (B, b) is a bisimulation χ ⊆ A × B such that a χ b. We say that (A, a) and (B, b) are locally bisimilar if there exists a bisimulation between them, in which case we write (A, a) (B, b). They are globally bisimilar if there exists a total, surjective bisimulation between them.
The following is readily verified by a structural induction on formulas (see e.g. [15] ). Recall that a variable p is free if it appears outside of the scope of µp or νp. As a special case, we can view an isomorphism as a bisimulation that is also a bijection. Isomorphism between structures will be denoted by ≅. Similarly, if A = B and Q is a set of atoms, we say that A, B agree everywhere on all atoms in Q if for every w ∈ A , (A, w) agrees with (B, w) on all atoms in Q. It is easy to see that if this is the case, then A and B are globally bisimilar relative to Q.
It is instructive to compare our notion of confluence to more familiar notions in the literature. We begin with the familiar notion of bisimulations between relational models: that is, for every a ∈ A and every ε > 0, there exists η > 0 such that if
2. f is forward-confluent with respect to d A , d B if and only if f is continuous and pointwise discrete; that is, if a ∈ A , then there is
3. f is backward-confluent with respect to c A and c B or, equivalently, with respect to d A and d B , if and only if f is open; that is, for every a ∈ A and every ε > 0, there exists
Next, we will review some well-known constructions that yield locally bisimilar models.
Generated submodels
Given Kripke models A, B, we say that A is a submodel of B if A ⊆ B , R A = R B ∩ ( A × A ), and V A (w) = V B (w) for all w ∈ A . It is typically not the case that A satisfies the same formulas as B, unless we assume that A has some additional properties.
Definition 4.5. If B is any Kripke frame or model, a set U ⊆ B is persistent if, whenever w ∈ U and w R B v, it follows that v ∈ U . If A is a subframe (respectively, submodel) of B, we say that A is persistent if A is.
In this case, the inclusion ι∶ A → B is a bisimulation, and thus we obtain: Lemma 4.6. If A is a persistent submodel of B and w ∈ A , then (A, w) is locally bisimilar to (B, w).
In particular, if we are concerned with satisfiaction of L µ * -formulas on a pointed model (B, w), it suffices to restrict our attention to the set of points accessible from w.
Definition 4.7. Given a binary relation R, let R * denote the transitive, reflexive closure of R.
Then, given a Kripke frame or model B and w ∈ B , we define the generated subframe (respectivel, submodel) of w to be the substructure of B with domain R *
B (w).
The following is then obvious from the definitions: Lemma 4.8. If B is a Kripke structure and w ∈ B , then the generated substructure of w is persistent.
Remark 4.9. Although we will not need this in the text, persistent substructures can be generalized to other classes of convergence spaces by considering substructures with open domain (see, e.g., [15] ). However, it is typically not the case that there is a least open substructure containing a given point w.
Model amalgamation
If {A i ∶ i ∈ I} is a family of sets, let us use ∐ i∈I A i to denote its disjoint union in a standard way. We extend this notation to families {A i ∶ i ∈ I} of Kripke models by setting
It is easy to check that, for any j ∈ I, A j is a persistent substructure of ∐ i∈I A i , and thus we obtain the following from Lemma 4.2:
The tools we have presented will be instrumental throughout the text to obtain many of our main results. Next, we turn our attention to discussing classes of convergence spaces that will be important throughout the text.
Special classes of spaces
Our main succinctness results use constructions based on Kripke semantics, which we then 'lift' to other classes of spaces. Specifically, we will focus on classes of K4 models that are confluent images of natural spaces, including Euclidean spaces. As the latter are connected and confluent maps preserve connectedness, we must work with K4 frames that share this property.
Connectedness
Given any K4 frame A, there always exists some metric space X such that there is a surjective confluent map f ∶ X → A [25] . However, if the space X is fixed beforehand, there is not always a guarantee that such a map exists. In particular, this is typically not the case for R n for any n, due to the fact that these spaces are connected; that is, they cannot be partitioned into two disjoint open sets. More formally, if R n = i(A) ∪ i(A), then either A = ∅ or A = ∅. This property is characterized by the connectedness axiom
studied by Shehtman in [13] .
Over the class of relational structures the connectedness axiom is not valid in general, but it is valid over a special class of frames.
Definition 5.1. Let A = ( A , R A ) be a K4 frame and B ⊆ A . We say that B is connected if for all w, v ∈ B, there are b 1 ⋯ b n ∈ B such that b 0 = w, b n = v, and for all i < n, either
We say that A is connected if A is connected, and that it is locally connected if for all a ∈ A , R(a) is connected. We say that A is totally connected if it is both connected and locally connected. The class of totally connected KD4 frames will be denoted TC.
A celebrated result of McKinsey and Tarski [12] states that any formula of L satisfiable over an S4 frame is satisfiable over the real line, or any other crowded 8 metric space X satisfying some natural properties. This result has since received several improvements and variations throughout the years (see e.g. [26, 27, 28, 29] ). We present a powerful variant proven in [15] , which states the following.
Theorem 5.2. Let X = ( X , d X ) be a crowded metric space equipped with the limit operator, and A = ( A , R A ) be finite TC frame. Then, there exists a surjective, confluent map f ∶ X → A .
Putting together Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 5.2, we obtain the following.
be a crowded metric space equipped with the limit operator, and
Proof. The map f is the surjective, confluent map provided by Theorem 5.2, and the valuation V X is defined by p ∈ V X (x) if and only if p ∈ V A (f (x)) for p ∈ P and x ∈ X . That (1) holds follows from Lemma 4.2.
Scattered spaces
In provability logic [30] , a seemingly unrelated application of modal logic, ◻ϕ is interpreted as 'ϕ is a theorem of (say) Peano arithmetic'. Surprisingly, the valid formulas under this interpretation are exactly the valid formulas over the class of scattered limit spaces, as shown by Solovay [31] . This non-trivial link between proof theory and spatial reasoning allows for an additional and unexpected application of the logics we are considering. For this, let us define scattered spaces in the context of convergence spaces.
In other words, if X = ∅, then there is a ∈ X ∖ ρ A (X); such a point is an isolated point of X. Examples of scattered spaces are not difficult to construct.
Lemma 5.5. Let A = ( A , R A ) be any K4 frame. Then, A is a scattered space if and only if R A is converse-well-founded; that is, there do not exist infinite sequences
In particular, if A is a finite K4 frame, then A is scattered as a convergence space if and only if R A is irreflexive. The class of frames with a transitive, converse well-founded relation is named GL after Gödel and Löb, whose contributions led to the development of provability logic.
Proof. Assume that (A, V ) is a scattered limit model. By the semantics of * , consider a set S such that, for i ≤ n, S ⊆ ρ A (S∩ ϕ i V ). But, this implies that S ⊆ ρ A (S), which, since A is scattered, means that S = ∅. Since * {ϕ 1 , ⋯, ϕ n } V is the union of all such S, we conclude that *
From this we immediately obtain the following.
is valid over the class of scattered spaces and t * (ϕ) ≤ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L * ∀ . Theorem 5.2 has an analogue for a family of 'nice' scattered spaces. Below and throughout the text, we use the standard set-theoretic convention that an ordinal is equivalent to the set of ordinals below it, i.e. ζ ∈ ξ if and only if ζ < ξ.
Recall that addition, multiplication and exponentiation are naturally defined on the ordinal numbers (see, e.g., [32] ) and that ω defines the least infinite ordinal. The following result can be traced back to Abashidze [33] and Blass [34] , and is proven in a more general form by Aguilera and the first author in [35] .
Theorem 5.9. If A is any finite GL frame, then there exists an ordinal Λ < ω ω and a surjective map f ∶ Λ → A that is confluent with respect to the limit operator on Λ.
As before, this readily gives us the following corollary:
Now that we have settled the classes of structures we are interested in, we discuss the techniques that we will use to establish our main succinctness results.
Model equivalence games
The limit-point, or set-derivative, operator is strictly more expressive than the closure operator [17] . Nevertheless, if we consider a formula such as ϕ = ⋯ n ⊺, we observe that its translation t (ϕ) into L is exponential.
In Section 7, we will show that this exponential blow-up is indeed inevitable. To be precise, we wish to show that there is no translation t∶ L → L for which exists a sub-exponential function f (x) such that t(ϕ) ≡ ϕ over the class of convergence spaces and t(ϕ) ≤ f ( ϕ ). In view of Theorem 5.7, to show that ϕ ≡ ψ over the class of convergence spaces (or even metric spaces), it suffices to exhibit a model A ∈ K4 and a ∈ A such that (A, a) ⊧ ϕ but (A, a) ⊧ ψ, or vice-versa. We will prove that such A exists whenever ψ is small by using model equivalence games, which are based on sets of pointed models.
We will use a, b, . . . to denote pointed models. As was the case for nonpointed structures, for a class of pointed models A and a formula ϕ, we write A ⊧ ϕ when a ⊧ ϕ for all a ∈ A, i.e., ϕ is true in any pointed model in A, and say that the formulas ϕ and ψ are equivalent on a class of pointed models A when a ⊧ ϕ if and only if a ⊧ ψ for all pointed models a ∈ A. We can also define an accessibility relation between pointed models. Definition 6.1. For a pointed model a = (A, a), we denote by ◻a the set {(A, b) ∶ a R A b}, i.e., the set of all pointed models that are successors of the pointed model a along the relation R A .
The game described below is essentially the formula-size game from Adler and Immerman [5] but reformulated slightly to fit our present purposes. The general idea is that we have two competing players, Hercules and the Hydra. Given a formula ϕ and a class of pointed models M, Hercules is trying to show that there is a "small" formula ψ in the language L that is equivalent to ϕ on M, whereas the Hydra is trying to show that any such ψ is "big". Of course, what "small" and "big" mean depends on the context at hand. The players move by adding and labelling nodes on a game-tree, T . Although our use of trees is fairly standard, they a prominent role throughout the text, so let us give some basic definitions before setting up the game. Definition 6.2. For our purposes, a tree is a pair (T, ≺), where T is any set and ≺ a strict partial order such that, if η ∈ T , then {ζ ∈ T ∶ ζ ≺ η} is finite and linearly ordered, and T has a minimum element called its root. We will sometimes notationally identify (T, ≺) with T , and write ≼ for the reflexive closure of ≺.
Maximal elements of T are leaves. If ζ, η ∈ T , we say that η is a daughter of ζ if ζ ≺ η and there is no ξ such that ζ ≺ ξ ≺ η. A path (of length m) on T is a sequence ⃗ η = (η i ) i≤m such that η i+1 is a daughter of η i whenever i < m.
Next, Definition 6.3 gives the precise moves that Hercules and the Hydra may play in the game. After that, the players continue the (ϕ, M)-meg on the pair (A, B) by constructing a finite game-tree T , in such a way that each node η ∈ T is labelled with a pair (L(η), R(η)) of classes of pointed models and one symbol that is either a literal or one from the set {∨, ∧, ◻, , ∃, ∀}. We will usually write L(η) ○ R(η) instead of (L(η), R(η)). The pointed models in L(η) are called the models on the left. Similarly, the pointed models in R(η) are called the models on the right.
Any leaf η can be declared either a head or a stub. Once η has been declared a stub, no further moves can be played on it. The construction of the game-tree begins with a root labeled by A ○ B that is declared a head.
Afterwards, the game continues as long as there is at least one head. In each turn, Hercules goes first by choosing a head η, labeled by L ○ R = L(η) ○ R(η). He then plays one of the following moves.
literal-move. Hercules chooses a literal ι such that L ⊧ ι and R ⊧ ι. The node η is declared a stub and labelled with the symbol ι.
∨-move. Hercules labels η with the symbol ∨ and chooses two sets
Two new heads, labeled by L 1 ○ R and L 2 ○ R, are added to the tree as daughters of η.
∧-move. Hercules labels η with the symbol ∧ and chooses two sets R 1 , R 2 ⊆ R such that R = R 1 ∪ R 2 . Two new heads, labeled by L ○ R 1 and L ○ R 2 , are added to the tree as daughters of η.
-move. Hercules labels η with the symbol and, for each pointed model l ∈ L, he chooses a pointed model from ◻l (if for some l ∈ L we have ◻l = ∅, Hercules cannot play this move). All these new pointed models are collected in the set L 1 . For each pointed model r ∈ R, the Hydra replies by picking a subset of ◻r.
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All the pointed models chosen by the Hydra are collected in the class R 1 . A new head labeled by L 1 ○ R 1 is added as a daughter to η. ◻-move. Hercules labels η with the symbol ◻ and, for each pointed model r ∈ R, he chooses a pointed model from ◻r (as before, if for some r ∈ R we have that ◻r = ∅, then Hercules cannot play this move). All these new pointed models are collected in the set R 1 . The Hydra replies by constructing a class of models L 1 as follows. For each l ∈ L, she picks a subset of ◻l and collects all these pointed models in the set L 1 . A head labeled by L 1 ○ R 1 is added as a daughter to η.
The (ϕ, M)-meg game concludes when there are no heads. Hercules has a winning strategy in n moves in the (ϕ, M)-meg iff no matter how the Hydra plays, the resulting game tree has n nodes and there are no heads; note that we do not count the move performed by the Hydra when setting up the playing field.
The relation between the (ϕ, M)-meg and formula-size is given by the following result. The essential features of the proof of the next theorem can be found in any one of [8, 36, 9] . Theorem 6.4. Hercules has a winning strategy in n moves in the (ϕ, M)-meg iff there is a L -formula ψ with ψ ≤ n that is equivalent to ϕ on M.
Intuitively, a winning strategy for Hercules in the (ϕ, M)-meg is given by the syntax tree T ψ of any L -formula ψ that is equivalent to ϕ on M (note that ϕ is not necessarily a modal formula: for example, it can be a first-or secondorder formula, or a formula from a different modal language). Since Hercules is trying to prove that there exists a small formula, i.e., the number of nodes in its syntax tree is small, while the Hydra is trying to show that any such formula is "big", if both Hercules and the Hydra play optimally and Hercules has a winning strategy, then the resulting game tree T is the syntax tree T ψ of the smallest modal formula ψ that is equivalent to ϕ on C. In particular, if L ○ R is the label of the root, we have that ψ must be true in every element of L and false on every element of R, which would be impossible if there were two bisimilar pointed models l ∈ L and r ∈ R. More generally, the subformula θ of ψ corresponding to any node η is true on all pointed models of L(η) and false on all pointed models of R(η). It follows that Hercules loses if any node has bisimilar models on the left and right, provided the Hydra plays well.
As for what it means to 'play well', note that the Hydra has no incentive to pick less pointed models in her turns, so it suffices to assume that she plays greedily:
Definition 6.5. We say that Hydra plays greedily if:
(a) whenever Hercules makes a -move on a head η, Hydra replies by choosing all of ◻b for each b ∈ R(η), and (b) whenever Hercules makes a ◻-move on a head η, Hydra replies by choosing all of ◻a for each a ∈ L(η).
If Hydra plays greedily, Hercules must avoid having bisimilar models on each side: Lemma 6.6. If Hydra plays greedily, no closed game tree contains a node η such that there are l ∈ L(η) and r ∈ R(η) that are locally bisimilar.
Proof. We prove by induction on the number of rounds in the game that, once a node η 0 such that there are bisimilar l ∈ L(η 0 ) and r ∈ R(η 0 ) is introduced, there will always be a head η with bisimilar pointed models on each side. The base case, where η 0 is first introduced, is trivial, as new nodes are always declared to be heads.
For the inductive step, assume that there are a head η, l = (L, l) ∈ L(η), r = (R, r) ∈ R(η), and a bisimulation χ ⊆ R × L with l χ r. We may also assume that Hercules plays on η, since otherwise η remains on the tree as a head.
Hercules cannot play a literal move on η since l and r agree on all atoms. If Hercules plays an ∨-move, he chooses L 1 , L 2 so that L 1 ∪ L 2 = L(η) and creates two new nodes η 1 and η 2 labeled by L 1 ○ R(η) and L 2 ○ R(η), respectively. If ) ∈ ◻l such that l ′ χ r ′ . It follows that, no matter how Hercules plays, the following state in the game will also contain two bisimilar pointed models, and hence the game-tree will never be closed. Example 6.7. A closed game tree for a model equivalence game is shown in Figure 2 . Pointed models occurring along the nodes of the tree are pairs consisting of the relevant model A 1 , A 2 or B and the nodes marked by ▷. The relations between the points in the respective Kripke frame are denoted by the arrows, i.e., if F ∈ {A 1 , A 2 , B}, then, for w, v ∈ F , we have w R F v if and only if there is an arrow coming out of w and pointing to v. We have only one proposition p which is shown next to the points in which it is true. Note that, if we disregard the Kripke models, the game tree is actually the syntax tree of the formula ◻p ∨ p. It is easily seen that, for any node η in the tree, the sub-formula of ◻p ∨ p starting at η is true in all the pointed models on the left of η and false in all the pointed models on the right. It is worth pointing out that Hercules could have also won if he had played according to the formula ◻p ∨ (p ∧ p).
Exponential succinctness of closure over derivative
Now we may use the model equivalence games we have presented to show that the closure operation is exponentially more succinct than the set-derivative operator. Our proof will be based on the following infinite sequence of formulas.
Definition 7.1. For every n ≥ 1, let the formulas ϕ n be defined recursively by (i) ϕ 1 = p 1 , and
Then, define ψ n = t (ϕ n ).
Recall that t was defined in Section 3.1, and that φ n is equivalent to ψ n for every n. Before we proceed, let us give some easy bounds on the size of the formulas we have defined, which can be proven by an easy induction. Lemma 7.2. For all n ∈ N, ϕ n ≤ 3n and ψ n ≥ 2 n .
Thus there is an exponential blow-up when passing from ϕ n to ψ n . We are going to show that on any class of models that contains the class of finite GL or TC models, we cannot find an essentially shorter formula than ψ n in the modal language L that is equivalent to ϕ n . This result will be a consequence of the following. Then, for every n ≥ 1, Hercules has no winning strategy of less than 2 n moves in the (ϕ n , C)-meg. This theorem will be proven later in this section. Once we do, we will immediately obtain a series of succinctness results: Proposition 7.4. Let C be a class of convergence spaces containing either:
1. the class of all finite GL frames, or 2. all finite TC frames, 3. the set of ordinals Λ < ω ω , or 4. any crowded metric space X .
Then, for all n ≥ 1, whenever ψ ∈ L is equivalent to ϕ n over C, it follows that ψ ≥ 2 ϕ 3 .
Proof. In the first two cases, the claim follows immediately from Theorems 7.3 and 6.4. Now, suppose that ψ ≤ 2 ϕn 3 . Then, by the first claim, there is a finite, pointed GL model (K, w) such that (K, w) ⊧ ψ ↔ ϕ n . By Corollary 5.10, there are a model M based on some Λ < ω ω and a surjective map f ∶ Λ → K such that
(w) we have that (M, ξ) ⊧ ψ ↔ ϕ n , and thus ψ is not equivalent to ϕ n on ω ω . If C contains a crowded metric space X , we reason analogously, but instead choose K to be a TC-model and use Corollary 5.3 to produce the required function f . Proposition 7.4 will be progressively improved throughout the text until culminating in Theorem 8.6. In order to prove Theorem 7.3 when C is the class of finite GL-models, we are going to define, for every n ≥ 1, a pair of sets of pointed GL-models A n , B n such that A n ⊧ ϕ n , whereas B n ⊧ ¬ϕ n . The Hydra is going to pick A n and B n when setting up the playing field for the (ϕ n , GL)-meg. After that, we show that Hercules has no winning strategy of less than 2 n moves. If A is a rooted model with successors, the critical branch of A is the maximal path ⃗ w = (w i ) i≤m such that w 0 is the root of A and w i+1 = S A (w i ) for all i < m; we say that m is the critical height of A.
The sets of models
We denote the generated subframe of S A (w 0 ) by S[A]. If w ∈ A and S A (w) is defined, we define S[(A, w)] = (A, S A (w)); note that in this case, we do not restrict the domain.
The partial function S A will not be used in the semantics, but it will help us to describe Hercules' strategy. Let us begin by defining recursively the two sets of pointed models A n and B n with critical branches containing 2 n pointed models each. The formal definition of A n and B n is as follows.
Definition 7.6. For n ≥ 0, the GL-models in the sets A n+1 = {A is a copy of B n i , except that p n+1 is true in the root. 2 n +j by adding a (fresh) irreflexive root b n+1 2 n +j to X which sees all elements of X and satisfies no atoms. We set
The models A n+1 2 n +j are constructed similarly, except that we take
, and add an irreflexive root which sees all elements of Y and satisfies no atoms. Finally, we set
Example 7.7. Figure 3 shows A 1 and B 1 . We are using the conventions established in Example 6.7 that each pointed model consists of the relevant model and the point designated with ▷. The indices of the propositional letters that are true on a point are shown next to it. In any frame F displayed and any w ∈ F , S F (w) is the right-most daughter of w (when it exists). Note that A 
. . .
S[A n+1
2 ] Figure 4 : The pointed models in the sets A n+1 and B n+1 .
Next, A 2 and B 2 are shown in Figure 5 , and are obtained as follows. A Finally, let us show how to obtain the models in A 3 and B 3 with the help of the models in A 2 and B 2 (see Figure 6 ). Note that the relations denoted by the arrows are actually transitive but the remaining arrows are not shown, in order to avoid cluttering.
As before, the first four pointed models in A 3 and B 3 are obtained from the four models in A 2 and B 2 , respectively, by simply making the new proposition p 3 true in their roots. To construct the next four models in A 3 and B 3 , observe Finally, we remark that S[A . In fact, the latter observation is only a special case of a general pattern. ] is isomorphic to B k+1 j .
Proof. By induction on n. In the base case, n = k, and A 
is defined by the clause for i ≤ 2 k , meaning that it is a copy of A n i with an atom added to the root. It follows that
as needed. The claim for B n+1 i is analogous.
In order for the Hydra to be allowed to set up the playing field with A n ○B n , we need our formulas ϕ n to be true on the left and false on the right, which is indeed the case, as we will see next.
Lemma 7.9. For all n ≥ 1, A n ⊧ ϕ n , whereas B n ⊧ ¬ϕ n .
Proof. By induction on n. If n = 1, then ϕ 1 = p 1 , which is true on all pointed models of A 1 and false on all models of B 1 , as can be seen by inspection on Figure 3 .
If n > 1, write n = m + 1. Recall that ϕ n = (p m+1 ∧ ϕ m ). Fix i ≤ 2 m+1 . Let a = (A, a) = a , we see that a ⊧ ϕ m+1 , which implies that a ⊧ ϕ m+1 .
Finally, for b we see by construction that the only point of B that satisfies p m+1 is S B (b). However, by the previous case, (B, S B (b) ) ⊧ ϕ m+1 , from which it follows that (B, S B (b)) ⊧ ϕ m , and hence b ⊧ ϕ m+1 .
The lower bound on the number of moves in (ϕ n , GL)-meg
The pointed models in A n ○ B n are constructed so that the critical branch of A n i is always very similar to the critical branch of B n i , differing only at their top point (see, for example, Figure 6 ). Let us make this precise. Note that the distinguishing value of two models M, N need not be defined, but when it is, it is unique. Moreover, the distinguishing values of the models we have constructed usually do exist. From this, the existence of a distinguishing value r < m follows by a straightforward induction on n. The base case, n = 1, follows vacuously since no two models in A 1 have the same critical height. For the inductive case, we assume the claim for n and prove it for n + 1. If i, j ≤ 2 n , then by the induction hypothesis we have that A 
For example, the pointed models (a The following lemma tells us that, while models A n i and B n j can never be bisimilar (since one satisfies ϕ n but the other does not), they can come quite close to being so. Lemma 7.13. Fix n ≥ 1 and r ≥ 0. 
Proof. The three claims are proven by induction on n, and their proofs have a very similar structure.
Claim (i). The base case (for n = 1) follows by observing Figure 3 . Indeed, the only twins are (a can we choose a ′ as in the antecedent, so in the other cases the claim is vacuously true. But in this case, we have that a ′ must be A Claim (ii). The base case can readily be verified for A 1 ○ B 1 on Figure 3 . The inductive step follows the same structure as that for claim (i) by swapping the roles of a and b, except that in the case where i > 2 n and b is the root of B, the proof is somewhat simplified as we always have
, and thus we can always take a ′ = b ′ .
Claim (iii). It is obvious that the proposition is trivially true for n = 1 because the respective critical heights of A Example 7.14. Lemma 7.13(iii) is best understood by looking at the models in Figures 5 and 6 . A simple inspection of Figure 5 is enough to see that a 7 that satisfies p 3 . Lemma 7.13 shows us that the moves that Hercules can make in order to win are, in fact, rather restricted. Below, for fixed n ≥ 1, say that Hydra plays amazingly if she labels the root by A n ○ B n and plays greedily. Since the respective rightmost branches in the pointed models a n j and b n j differ on a literal only in their leaves, we see that for every pair of twins (a, b), the Hydra's strategy forces Hercules to make m many -moves, where m is the critical height of a and b. Let us make this precise.
] and a closed game tree (T, ≼). Then, define Λ(i) to be the set of leaves η of T such that for every η ′ ≼ η, there is some
The sets Λ(i) are non-empty and disjoint when Hydra plays amazingly, from which our exponential lower bound will follow immediately. To prove this, we will need the following lemma. Proof. Assume that the Hydra played amazingly, and that a closed game tree T with root η 0 is given.
Claim (a). We proceed by induction on ζ along ≺. For the induction to go through, we need to prove a slightly stronger claim: if Hercules has played r -moves before ζ, then (S r [a
For the base case this is clear, as only S 0 [a
, and Hercules has played zero -moves before η 0 .
For the inductive step, assume the claim for ζ, and suppose that ζ ′ ≼ η is a daughter of ζ; we will prove claims (a) and (c) for ζ ′ . Let r be the number of -moves that Hercules has played before ζ. Since η ∈ Λ(i), we have that We are finally ready to prove our lower bound on the number of moves in the (ϕ n , GL)-meg. In fact, we have proven a slightly stronger claim.
Proposition 7.19. For every n ≥ 1, Hercules has no winning strategy of less than 2 n moves in the (ϕ n ,
Proof. Assume that Hydra plays amazingly, and let T be a closed game tree. Then, by Lemma 7.18, the sets of leaves
]} are non-empty and disjoint. It follows that there are at least 2 n leaves, and since closing each leaf requires one literal move, Hercules must have played at least 2 n moves.
Since A n ∪ B n ⊆ GL, Theorem 7.3(a) readily follows. In view of Theorem 6.4, we also obtain the following stronger form of Proposition 7.41:
7.3. L is exponentially more succinct than L on TC We proceed to show that Hercules has no winning strategy of less than 2 n moves in (ϕ n , TC)-meg. We begin by defining two sets of pointed modelsÂ n andB n that are a slight modification of the models in A n and B n , respectively.
If K is equipped with a successor partial function S K , we also define SK = S K . For a class of models X, we denote {K ∶ K ∈ X} byX. In other words, we add a 'point at infinity' that is seen by both worlds. Note that the successor function remains unchanged, i.e. ∞ is never a successor. In particular, ∞ can never belong to a critical branch.
This operation allows us to easily turn a model into a totally connected model: Proof. If w, w ′ ∈ M , then w, ∞, w ′ is a path connecting w to w ′ (as x RM ∞ holds for all x ∈ M ). It follows thatM is connected, and indeed the same path witnesses thatM is locally connected if we take w, w ′ ∈ R M (u). The second claim follows from observing that if χ ⊆ M × N is a bisimulation then so iŝ χ = χ ∪ {(∞, ∞)} ⊆ M × N , and the third by choosing an arbitrary suchχ (say,∅).
We have the following analogue of Lemma 7.9. The proof is identical and we omit it.
Intuitively, the proof that Hercules has no winning strategy of less than 2 n moves in the game that starts withÂ n ○B n revolves around the observation that the models inÂ n andB n are constructed in such a way that Hercules, when playing a -or ◻-move at some position labeled by L ○ R, cannot pick ∞ in any model of L or R, as this will lead to bisimilar pointed models on each side. Thus, given the construction of the models inÂ n andB n , Hercules and the Hydra are essentially playing a (ϕ n , GL)-meg on A n ○ B n and the lower bound on the number of moves in any winning (ϕ n , GL)-meg for Hercules on A n ○ B n established in the previous sub-section applies to the present case too. Let us formalise the above intuitive considerations. As before, we will say that the Hydra plays amazingly in the (ϕ n , TC)-meg if she labels the root bŷ A n ○B n and plays greedily.
Lemma 7.24. Fix n ≥ 1, and assume that the Hydra plays amazingly in the (ϕ n , TC)-meg.
Then, for any position η in a closed game tree T such that L(η) and R(η) are both non-empty, Proof. The claims are symmetric, so we prove the first. If Hercules picked a frame of the form (A, ∞), since the Hydra plays greedily, she will also pick at least one frame of the form (B, ∞). By Lemma 7.22, (A, ∞) (B, ∞), which in view of Lemma 6.6 contradicts the assumption that T is closed.
We will not give a full proof of Theorem 7.3.(b), as it proceeds by replacing A n ○ B n byÂ n ○B n throughout Section 7.2. Instead, we give a rough outline below.
Proposition 7.25. For every n ≥ 1, Hercules has no winning strategy of less than 2 n moves in the (ϕ n ,Â n ∪B n )-meg.
Proof sketch. The rest of the results leading up to Proposition 7.4 rely on these basic lemmas and thus readily apply to the (ϕ n , TC)-meg. In particular, Definition 7.16 makes no assumption about the frames appearing in T , hence the sets Λ(i) for i ∈ [1, 2 n ] are readily available for the (ϕ n , TC)-meg, and as before are disjoint and non-empty. We conclude that Hercules has no winning strategy in less than 2 n moves. Proposition 7.26. For all n ≥ 1, whenever ψ ∈ L is such that ϕ n ≡ ψ on A n ∪B n , it follows that ψ ≥ 2 n . 
Succinctness in the extended language
Proposition 7.4 holds even if we replace L by the extended language L * ∀ . In this section, we will first extend these results to L ∀ and then to L * ∀ .
Succinctness with the universal modality
As it turns out, the universal modality is not of much help in expressing succinctly. This is perhaps not surprising, as is essentially a local operator and ∀ is global. The disjoint union operation from Section 4.3 will be useful in making this precise. Definition 8.1. Let the model C n be obtained by taking the disjoint union of all the models used in A n and B n i.e.,
The models C n will allow us to make the universal modality effectively useless in distinguishing between the pointed models we have constructed.
Thus, for any L ∀ -formula ψ that is equivalent to ϕ n on C n , we have that its translation t C n ∀ (ψ) is also equivalent to ϕ n on A n ∪ B n . Note, however, that according to Proposition 7.20, the size of t C n ∀ (ψ) is at least 2 n . This establishes the proposition for C n . ForĈ n we proceed as above, but work instead with Proposition 7.26.
Succinctness with tangle and fixed points
Recall that the translation t * (ϕ) is defined simply by replacing every occurrence of * Φ by and every occurrence of ◻ * Φ by ⊺. Since Proposition 7.4 applies to scattered spaces, we can use our work in Section 5.2 to immediately obtain succinctness results relative to the tangled derivative over such spaces.
For metric spaces, however, the behavior of the tangled derivative is less trivial. Fortunately, in the TC models we have constructed, its behavior is still rather simple.
Concluding remarks
There are several criteria to take into account when choosing the 'right' modal logic for spatial reasoning. It has long been known that the limit-point operator leads to a more expressive language than the closure operator does, making the former seem like a better choice of primitive symbol. However, our main results show that one incurs in losses with respect to formula-size, and since the blow-up is exponential, this could lead to situations where e.g. formally proving a theorem expressed with the closure operator is feasible, but treating its limit-operator equivalent is not. Similarly, the results of [20] make the tangled limit operator seem like an appealing alternative to the spatial µ-calculus, given its simpler syntax and more transparent semantics. Unfortunately, the price to pay is also an exponential blow-up.
We believe that the takeaway is that different modal logics may be suitable for different applications, and hope that the work presented here can be instrumental in clarifying the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Moreover, there are many related questions that remain open and could give us a more complete picture of the relation between such languages.
For example, one modality that also captures interesting spatial properties is the 'difference' modality, where ⟨≠⟩ϕ holds at w if there is v = w satisfying ϕ. This modality has been studied in a topological setting by Kudinov [37] , and succinctness between languages such as L ∀ and L ⟨≠⟩ remains largely unexplored. Even closer to the present work is the tangled closure operator, * , defined analogously to * , but instead using the closure operation. The techniques we have developed here do not settle whether L µ is exponentially more succinct than L * . There are also possible refinements of our results. Our construction uses infinitely many variables, and it is unclear if L is still exponentially more succinct than L when restricted to a finite number of variables. Finally, note that Theorem 8.6 is sharp in the sense that an exponential translation is available, but this is not so clear for Theorem 8.7, in part because an explicit translation is not given in [20] . Sharp upper and lower bounds remain to be found.
